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Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of
American Criminal Lawt
by
K THLEEN F. BRicKEY*
Introduction
The federalization of American criminal law is a twentieth cen-
tury phenomenon. It is an outgrowth of structural changes in society
and of shifting political winds. This Symposium presents an excep-
tionally timely opportunity for reexamining the forces that drive the
movement to federalize more and more crimes,1 and the conse-
quences that flow from yielding to them. One could cite any number
of reasons to consider this an optimal time to reexamine federaliza-
tion issues, but enumeration of a few will suffice.
Crime is very much on America's mind. In January 1994 more
than forty percent of Americans surveyed identified crime as the na-
tion's most pressing problem.2 Even though the violent crime rate de-
clined slightly over the last few years3 and is somewhat below its peak
in the 1980s,4 Americans believe that our nation is in the midst of an
unprecedented crime wave. As the Senate Report accompanying the
t © Copyright Kathleen F. Brickey.
* James Carr Professor of Criminal Jurisprudence, Washington University, St.
Louis. I want to express my thanks to Stuart Banner, Ronald Mann, and the many other
colleagues who read and commented on an earlier draft of this Article, and to John Bodnar
for his invaluable research assistance.
1. There are already more than 3,000 federal crimes on the books. W. John Moore,
The High Price of Good Intentions, NAT' L.J., May 8, 1993, at 1140.
2. Stephen Braun & Judy Pastemak, A Nation with Peril on Its Mind, Crime Has
Become the Top Concern of Many People, L.A. Tdnvs, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al.
3. There was a minuscule drop in the violent crime rate between 1991 and 1992.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRME REPORT 1992, at 10. It declined
three percent in the first six months of 1993. Braun & Pasternak, supra note 2. A 1994
New York City Police Department survey of 22 urban police departments revealed that in
20 of the cities, the number of felonies committed in the first six months of the year was
lower (in some instances dramatically lower) than the number committed in the first half of
1993. Clifford Krauss, Urban Crime Rates Falling This Year, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 8, 1994, at
A9.
4. Braun & Pasterak, supra note 2.
[1135]
1995 Budget puts it, "a law enforcement emergency exists in this
country."5
Although the forty percent figure represents a significant jump
over responses elicited in June 1992, the increase may be partly attrib-
utable to another reason why it is time to revisit the issue of federal-
ized crime. That is the spectacle surrounding the protracted
congressional debate on what ultimately became the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.6 That debate brought the
good, the bad, and the ugly sides of the federalization movement into
full public view.
7
Chief Justice Rehnquist's warning that incautious federalization
of criminal law threatens to overwhelm the federal justice system is
another important consideration.8 The system's workload is in large
measure controlled by what laws Congress passes and by the exercise
of executive department discretion to enforce them, vigorously or not.
This Article explores the evolution and momentum of the feder-
alization phenomenon and examines its implications for the federal
justice system. The overarching issue is whether (and if so, how) the
trend to expand the body of federal criminal law and enlarge the role
of a national police power can be reconciled with long-standing princi-
ples of federalism. The Article concludes that, sadly, it cannot.
5. S. REP. No. 103-309, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1994) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT].
6. The Act was first introduced in 1990 but remained stalled until November 1993,
when it passed both houses of Congress. From then until final enactment of the measure in
August 1994, controversy swirled around the bill. See Braun & Pasternak, supra note 2
(stating that the bill was "swollen with amendments" ranging from helpful, to neutral, to
"just wacky").
7. Perhaps the lowest point in the proceedings came when Senator Alphonse
D'Amato sang a parody of "Old MacDonald Had a Farm" on the floor of the Senate-
standing beside a large picture of a pink pig feeding at a trough-to protest what he de-
nounced as "pork" in the bill. Dirk Johnson, Voices from the Grass Roots: Anger over
Partisan Politics, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 27, 1994, at Al.
8. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 4-5, reprinted
in THE THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1994, at 1, 3; Hon.
William H. Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 1, 3-4, reprinted in THE
THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1993, at 1-3; Hon. William
H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 5, reprinted in THE THIRD
BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1992, at 1, 3.
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I. The Development of a Federal Law of Crimes
A. Navigating Uncharted Waters
Before the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution had
little to say about federal criminal law.9 It vested Congress with
power to punish counterfeiting the currency and securities of the
United States, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
crimes violating the law of nations.' 0 It enjoined both Congress and
the states from passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws" and
provided for trial by jury in federal prosecutions' 2 and extradition of
fugitives from justice. 13
The proper role and scope of federal criminal jurisdiction was not
entirely free from doubt.' 4 The Constitution did not directly confer
power to exercise general criminal jurisdiction, and controversy sur-
rounded the question whether federal courts had jurisdiction over
common-law crimes.' 5 Thus, when Congress first entered the realm of
9. The Bill of Rights, of course, said quite a lot about criminal law and procedure.
The Fourth Amendment guaranteed citizens freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures and forbade the issuance of search warrants except on probable cause. U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment required the government to proceed by a grand
jury indictment or presentment in cases of capital or other infamous crimes. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. It also prohibited exposing a defendant to double jeopardy and created the
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. The Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to a
speedy and public jury trial and the right to counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. And the
Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of excessive bail, cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and excessive fines. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10. Id. art. I, § 8.
11. Id. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
12. Id. art. III, § 2.
13. Id. art. IV, § 2.
14. See GEORGE L. HASINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CIRCUIT
COURTS-CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 633-43 (1971) [hereinafter HOLMES DEVISE].
15. Many judges believed that federal courts had jurisdiction over common-law
crimes. Martin Conboy, Federal Criminal Law, in A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at
205, 303 (1937). Cf. United States v. McGill, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 426, 429 (1806) ("There
are.., many crimes and offences against the authority of the United States, which have not
been specifically defined by law; for I have often decided, that the federal Courts have a
common law jurisdiction in criminal cases . ").
Others, however, considered this an unsupportable proposition. For instance, in
United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 384, 393, 395 (1789), Justice Chase stated:
[T]he question recurs, when and how, have the Courts of the United States ac-
quired a common law jurisdiction, in criminal cases? The United States must pos-
sess the common law themselves, before they can communicate it to their Judicial
agents: Now, the United States did not bring it with them from England; the Con-
stitution does not create it; and no act of Congress has assumed it. Besides, what
is the common law to which we are referred? Is it the common law entire, as it
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federal criminal law, it navigated uncharted waters, and cautiously at
that.
Congress's reluctance to enact expansive criminal laws may have
been partly attributable to a recognition that the Founding Fathers
never envisioned a national police power. Indeed, they were skeptical
about general federal jurisdiction. 16 Thus, what little criminal jurisdic-
tion Congress invoked was often shared with the states. State courts
were given concurrent, and sometimes primary, jurisdiction over des-
ignated federal crimes.
17
The early federal criminal laws addressed only issues of special
federal interest. To be sure, some of them were-like state crimes-
ordinary criminal offenses. But they were crimes committed within a
special federal sphere. Thus, for example, the Crimes Act of 1790
punished murder and other crimes committed in a fort or other place
controlled by the federal government, crimes committed outside the
jurisdiction of any state,18 forgery of United States certificates and
other public securities, perjury in federal court, treason, piracy, and
committing acts of violence against an ambassador.' 9
The federal government's assumption of a limited role in main-
taining everyday law and order left primary jurisdiction over criminal
matters with the states.20 That seemed natural enough because crime
was a matter of principally local interest and impact. Murders, rob-
beries, rapes, and burglaries did not implicate any special federal in-
terest unless they were committed within a federal enclave.
Moreover, the criminal law was an expression of local mores and con-
cerns. Thus, when states legislated morality, Louisiana was free to le-
exists in England; or modified as it exists in some of the States; and of the various
modifications, which are we to select... ?
The Supreme Court definitively resolved this question in United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812), holding that federal courts had no jurisdic-
tion over common-law crimes. But cf. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415,
415-16 (1816) (revealing uncertainty on the question whether Hudson & Goodwin con-
trolled with respect to offenses committed within federal admiralty jurisdiction).
16. See generally Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38
HARV. L. REv. 545, 546-48 (1925) (many of the Constitution's staunchest supporters fa-
vored quite limited federal judicial power, and the Judiciary Act of 1789 represented a
compromise between advocates of that view and those who favored a full federal judicial
power).
17. Id. at 548-52.
18. On the high seas, for example.
19. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNIsHmENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 71
(1994).
20. John S. Baker, Jr., Nationalizing Criminal Law: Does Organized Crime Make It
Necessary or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 495, 502 (1985).
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galize lotteries2' while Utah chose to outlaw them. Nevada could
boost its economy by permitting prostitution and casino gambling
while New Hampshire could choose to ban them. These were matters
of inherently local interest, and the states were capable of protecting
themselves against whatever evils they chose to proscribe and punish.
The mid- to late-nineteenth century ushered in the era of regula-
tory crimes. At first, most were predominantly state and local regula-
tions that reflected much about the economy they were designed to
protect. Thus, Mississippi criminalized the fraudulent baling of cot-
ton, Rhode Island protected its oyster beds from destructive methods
of harvesting, Minnesota required logging companies to adopt and use
distinctive marks on their logs, and Maryland criminalized cutting or
destroying tobacco plants that belonged to another.22
During this era, federal criminal law remained a minor player.
Narrowly drawn federal crimes were tailored to provide protections in
matters of direct federal interest or matters that the states were pow-
erless to address-theft from a federal bank by a bank employee,23
arson on a federal vessel outside of any state's jurisdiction, 2A immigra-
tion and customs offenses, tax fraud, and smuggling.25
It was not until after the Civil War that Congress enacted criminal
laws that reflected concerns extending beyond direct federal interests.
Newly enacted federal civil rights acts guaranteed all citizens equal
rights to enter into contracts, to own and convey property, to enjoy
the protection of all "laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property,"'26 to exercise the elective franchise free from unlawful
interference,z7 and to benefit from federal enforcement of the newly
21. For a history of the Louisiana Lottery Company, its connection to organized
crime, and its ultimate demise via state and federal legislation, see id. at 532-36.
22. FPiuDMAN, supra note 19, at 114. There was, of course, a broad array of less
parochial regulatory crimes, many of which were the product of municipal ordinances.
These less visible crimes arose out of regulations relating to licensing taverns and pawnbro-
kers, reporting contagious diseases, selling rancid meat or diluted milk, and the like. Id. at
114-15.
23. Louis B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13
LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 64, 65 (1948).
24. Id.
25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 262. Federal criminal prosecutions were relatively
few in number and were "quite a miscellaneous lot." Id. They ranged from sailors' deser-
tion at sea to federal liquor violations, from violation of the revenue laws to cutting federal
timber. Id.
26. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27,27 (reenacted by Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144) [hereinafter 1866 Act].
27. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140 [hereinafter 1870 Act]. Interest-
ingly, the 1870 Act imposed mandatory minimum penalties for violating its misdemeanor
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established rights to equal protection and equal privileges and immu-
nities under the laws.28 In addition to imposing criminal liability for
depriving any citizen of a right secured therein, one act conferred fed-
eral jurisdiction over state crimes where the affected citizens were de-
nied their rights or where state courts would not enforce them.
29
Thus, the federal government assumed concurrent jurisdiction over
murder, assault, and a host of other state crimes.
30
During the same period, Congress enacted the Post Office Act of
1872, which forbade mailing lottery tickets or obscene matter or using
the mails to defraud.31 The postal legislation was consistent with fed-
eralism principles. The states lacked jurisdiction to regulate the postal
system and thus were powerless to shield their residents from nation-
wide frauds, the perils of interstate gambling, or the introduction of
offensive articles within their borders. 32 Although use of the mails
served as a jurisdictional hook that made fraud or gambling a matter
of federal interest, use of the mails was also critical to multistate trans-
actions conducted at arm's length. The postal legislation was thus
auxiliary to state law enforcement efforts.33 It supplemented, rather
than supplanted, state criminal law.
provisions. Mandatory minimums have recently emerged as the federal sentence du jour.
See infra text accompanying notes 104-108.
28. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
29. 1866 Act, supra note 26, § 3. The Act granted the district and circuit courts con-
current jurisdiction over civil and criminal actions affecting those citizens. This allowed
what were otherwise essentially state criminal cases to be prosecuted in federal court. The
common law and statutory law of the state where the crime occurred controlled if federal
law did not provide a suitable punishment.
30. In addition to directly granting federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over some
state crimes, see supra note 29, the Acts indirectly assumed such jurisdiction by reaching
conduct otherwise punishable by state criminal law but motivated by an intent to deprive
the victims of their civil rights. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (mob
violence).
To the extent that the civil rights acts symbolized a national commitment to end racial
discrimination, the federal courts were uniquely positioned to speak with a national voice.
31. Baker, supra note 20, at 514. The Postal Act was followed the next year by the
Comstock Law, which forbade using the mails to send obscene books, contraceptives, or
articles for procuring abortion. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 135.
32. Without such legislation, a purveyor of fraudulent investments in western mines
might exploit a nationwide "'sucker list.' through the mails with impunity. Schwartz, supra
note 23, at 74. The victims could be scattered throughout the country, have relatively mi-
nor individual losses, and be unable to convince the local prosecutor to incur the expense
of extraditing the malefactor. Id Whether the local prosecutor could develop the proof
needed to establish the true worth of an investment in a mine thousands of miles away is
also subject to conjecture. Id.
33. See id at 73-75.
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The civil rights legislation, in contrast, entered what had thereto-
fore been the exclusive domain of the states. It put the federal gov-
ernment in the business of enforcing state criminal laws because the
states were unwilling to act. 4 However noble their purpose, then, the
civil rights acts indelibly altered the role of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion and signaled the coming presence of a national police power.
35
B. The Culture of Mobility
The rise of federal regulatory crimes in the late-nineteenth cen-
tury36 was inextricably intertwined with the emergence of a "culture
of mobility. '37 State statutes designed to protect the local economy
became less and less effective as more and more problems crossed
34. Apart from abolishing slavery, the South made little or no accommodation for
emancipated slaves. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLAcK AMEmCA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 44 (1976).
Southern states denied the former slaves the right to vote, failed to provide for their educa-
tion, enacted restrictive laws governing their movement and behavior, and generally ex-
cluded them from participation in civic life. Id at 45-46.
Worse, still, Blacks were denied justice both by the police and by the courts. With the
rise of the Ku Klux Klan and vigilantism in the mid- to late nineteenth century, Blacks
could not feel safe. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 187-92. According to a NAACP
report on lynching prepared in 1919, during the 30-year period when lynching was at its
peak, lynch mobs killed more than 100 blacks per year. Id. at 190-91.
The Supreme Court's narrow construction of the Civil War Amendments, U.S. CONST.
amends. XIII, XIV, XV, nullified much of the civil rights legislation enacted to implement
their protections. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638 (1883) (the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection was designed to protect citizens from
arbitrary and tyrannical action by the state; it does not authorize Congress to enact legisla-
tion protecting citizens against conspiracies to deprive them of the equal protection of the
laws); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,554-55 (1875) (the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee citizens freedom from en-
croachment on fundamental rights by the states; they do not confer authority on Congress
to protect citizens against conspiracies to hinder the free exercise and enjoyment of those
rights); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,217-22 (1875) (rather than conferring a right of
suffrage, the Fifteenth Amendment only prohibits states from denying the right to vote on
account of race; it does not empower Congress to generally punish interference with the
exercise of the elective franchise). See CHARLEs FAnuAAN, 7 HOLMES DEvIsE, supra note
14, at 225-73.
How vigorously the government enforced what remained intact is open to question.
In the fiscal year ending in June 1889, for example, there were a total of 14,588 criminal
prosecutions in the federal district courts, more than a third of which were for internal
revenue offenses. Only 12 were classified as civil rights cases. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at
262.
35. See Baker, supra note 20, at 513-14 (describing the role of civil rights legislation
and the 1872 Post Office Act in altering the federal government's powers with respect to
the enforcement of criminal laws).
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 116-21.
37. Id. at 209.
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state borders. Iowa could try to halt the spread of "Texas fever" by
making it a crime to bring Texas cattle into the state without first
keeping them for at least one winter in a locale as far north as Kansas
or Missouri.38 It could also try to protect livestock from contagious
diseases by forbidding knowingly driving diseased animals into the
state.39 But at some point it would become clear that Iowa could not
protect its livestock from every conceivable infection. A more power-
ful regulatory mechanism was needed to accomplish that.
At this juncture, Congress stepped in. In 1884 Congress forbade
railroads and boat lines from accepting or transporting diseased live-
stock.40 Shortly thereafter, it enacted the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Sherman Act.41 And by the turn of the century, Congress was
fully poised to radically enlarge the scope and concept of federal crim-
inal jurisdiction.
The first part of the twentieth century brought with it the Mann
Act (prohibiting transporting a woman across state lines for illicit pur-
poses),42 the Dyer Act (prohibiting transporting a stolen motor vehi-
cle across state lines), 43 the Volstead Act (just plain Prohibition),44
and statutes forbidding45 interstate transportation of lottery tickets,46
interstate transportation of obscene literature, and selling liquor
through the mail.47 As these examples illustrate, Congress had begun
to rely on the commerce power (with ever increasing regularity) to
enlarge federal criminal jurisdiction. The advent of railroads,
automobiles, and airplanes made state boundaries "increasingly
porous." 48
38. Id. at 116.
39. Id. The latter statute forbade bringing into the state any sheep that had a conta-
gious disease or "any 'horse, mule, or ass, affected by the diseases known as nasal gleet,
glanders, or button-farcey."' Id
40. Id. This move also signaled the bloating of the federal bureaucracy, as Congress
established a Bureau of Animal Industry under the Commissioner of Agriculture. Id
41. Baker, supra note 20, at 517.
42. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825.
43. Act of Oct. 29, 1919, ch. 89, 41 Stat. 324.
44. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305.
45. Act of Mar. 3, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963.
46. Act of Feb. 8, 1897, ch. 172, 29 Stat. 512.
47. Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 162, 39 Stat. 1202. Congress had earlier made liquor that
was transported into a Prohibition state subject to the laws of that state. Act of Aug. 8,
1890, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313. After the turn of the century, Congress made it an offense to
transport liquor into a state where its use was prohibited. Act of Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, 37
Stat. 699.
48. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 263.
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If the constitutionality of commerce-based criminal jurisdiction
was ever in serious doubt, the issue was fairly short-lived. In 1925 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Dyer Act in Brooks
v. United States.49 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Taft
spoke of elaborate interstate auto theft conspiracies that were beyond
the power of state and local governments to control. The "radical
change in transportation" wrought by the automobile had enabled
"evil minded persons" to abscond with vehicles to locales remote from
the scene of the crime.50 Laws like the Dyer Act were necessary be-
cause even though auto theft could be punished as larceny under state
criminal law, the jurisdiction where the theft occurred was powerless
to pursue the thief across state lines. Its "[j]urisdiction stop[ped] at
the border. ' 51 By crossing the state line, the thief could defy hot pur-
suit by local authorities. But it was precisely at the border that federal
jurisdiction began.
By the 1930s the federalization of American criminal law was in
full swing. During this era Congress enacted the Lindbergh Act
(prohibiting the transportation of a kidnapping victim across state
lines),52 the Fugitive Felon Act (prohibiting interstate flight to avoid
49. 267 U.S. 432 (1925). The Court had earlier upheld the constitutionality of the
Mann Act in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) and the Lottery Act in Champion
v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
50. 267 U.S. at 438. This "helps to conceal the trail of the thieves, gets the stolen
property into another police jurisdiction and facilitates the finding of a safer place in which
to dispose of the booty at a good price." Id. at 438-39.
Seven years later, the House debate on the Lindbergh Act echoed the same senti-
ments. Representative LaGuardia observed that the advent of modem transportation and
communication facilitated escape, removal of the loot, and the dispersal of witnesses. This
necessitated federal intervention because the country had passed the time when "crime
was localized and escape was slow." 75 CONG. Rec. H132, 13,289 (daily ed. June 17,
1932).
51. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 264.
Although it might be possible to extradite the thief if he were apprehended in another
state, extradition laws were unwieldy and could be costly to invoke. Note, The Fugitive
Felon Act Its Function and Purpose, 1964 WAsH. U. L.Q. 355, 357-58. In addition, the
ability to extradite depended on the willingness of the state into which the stolen vehicle
had been driven to apprehend the thief. Id.; see also Note, The Scope of Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 LAw FORUM 805, 806.
52. Ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (1932). The Act was amended in 1934 to make it a capital
crime and to create a presumption that a state line had been crossed if the victim was
missing for seven days. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 266. That presumption vested the
federal government with jurisdiction to investigate. Today, the presumption arises if the
victim is missing more than 24 hours. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988).
Congressional debate on the Lindbergh Act presaged the current discussion of the
centralization of crime control responsibility. Representative Michener criticized the bill,
which purported to deal with the crime of kidnapping but in reality dealt with transporting
a kidnapping victim in commerce. 75 CONG. Ruc. H13,283 (1932). He urged Congress to
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prosecution for enumerated violent felonies),53 the National Firearms
Act (regulating the sale of guns), 54 the National Stolen Property Act
(prohibiting the transportation of stolen property in interstate com-
merce),55 and statutes that punished robbing a national bank,56 extor-
tion by telephone, telegraph or radio,57 and much more.58
These developments were critical because they transformed what
had been uniquely local concerns into national ones. Because
"[t]wentieth century criminals had wheels and wings," 59 crime was
now perceived as an interstate problem beyond the power of states to
effectively address.
Thus, it was inevitable that from the New Deal forward, Congress
would continue down the road to federalized crime. But with the ad-
vent of the omnibus crime bill, the pace at which new crimes appeared
on the books accelerated. Omnibus crime bills can be hundreds of
pages long and contain an infinite number of provisions defining new
crimes, revising existing laws, financing crime control and prison
projects, and whatever else is on Congress's mind.60
exercise caution in enacting more federal criminal laws that punish conduct the states can
effectively address. His concerns included reposing more authority in Washington and giv-
ing the federal government burdens that it should not assume. Id. Although conceding
that he would vote for the bill, he emphasized that "this must not become a precedent for
more legislation giving the Federal Government concurrent authority with the States in
enforcing police regulations and laws dealing with matters in which the States are primarily
interested, and which can be properly dealt with by State action." Id. at H13,283-84.
Representatives LaGuardia and Woodruff, in contrast, emphasized the interstate na-
ture of much criminal activity and the states' inability to enforce their laws beyond their
borders. Id. at H13,289, H13,300. Putting the Lindbergh Act in contemporary context,
Representative Woodruff argued that "[ilt is ridiculous that if a criminal steals an automo-
bile and takes it outside the State he can be apprehended and prosecuted by Federal offi-
cials [under the Dyer Act], but if he commits murder, robbery, kidnaping, or any other
crime he is free to come and go at will so far as the Federal authorities are concerned." Id
at 13,300. Therein lies the slippery slope.
53. Ch. 302, 48 Stat. 782 (1934).
54. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236.
55. Ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (1934).
56. Ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783 (1934).
57. Ch. 300, 48 Stat. 781 (1934).
58. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 267.
59. Id. at 266.
60. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4181, was more than 350 pages long. By the time the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 was pared down to eliminate "pork," racial justice in death pen-
alty cases, and a host of other ills, the bill was just under 100 pages long and contained 32
separate titles. They covered such disparate subjects as community policing, prisons, crime
prevention, drug courts, violence against women, the death penalty, mandatory minimum
sentences, firearms, criminal aliens, rural crime, and marketing scams directed at senior
citizens, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
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Included among them are the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,61 the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,62 the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,63
the Crime Control Act of 1984,64 the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 198665
and 1988,66 the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990,67 and the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.68 Through
these and other laws, Congress introduced major new concepts into
the criminal law lexicon-concepts like RICO, continuing criminal en-
terprise, strike force, money laundering, currency reporting, carjack-
ing, DEA, environmental crime, in personam forfeiture, clinic access,
organizational fines, and "three strikes," to name a few.
At the same time, Congress steadily increased the authorized
penalties for hundreds of crimes. To preserve the deterrent value of
criminal fines, which inflation had eroded, it became necessary to in-
crease authorized fine levels.69 To preserve political capital, it became
necessary to increase the severity of prison terms.70 Congress simply
could not resist the citizens' demands to be "tough on crime" because
crime had assumed the spotlight as a national political issue.
71
61. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
62. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
63. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
64. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
65. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
66. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
67. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
68. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
69. Cf. H.R CoNF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 579 (1982) (explaining that it
was necessary to increase authorized fines for tax crimes because the fines had not been
changed for years and inflation had robbed them of their deterrent value).
70. During the latest round of sentence inflation, Congress required mandatory life
imprisonment for defendants convicted of a serious violent felony if they have previously
been convicted of two or more serious violent felonies, or one or more serious violent
felonies and one or more serious drug offenses. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 70001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1982 (1994). The prior
convictions may have been obtained in state and/or federal court. Id. Congress also condi-
tioned states' eligibility for prison construction grants on the enactment of stringent sen-
tencing laws and the observance of more severe sentencing practices. See infra note 200.
71. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 274. Herbert Hoover was the first President to men-
tion crime in his inaugural address in 1929. Id. at 273. Observing that crime was on the
increase, he proposed to establish a federal commission to study this phenomenon. This
resulted in the creation of the Wickersham Commission, which in 1931 published 14 re-
ports on various aspects of the crime problem. Id. Although most of the Commission's
recommendations went unheeded, iL at 274, the reports documented widespread use of
police brutality to extract involuntary confessions and led to the demise of third degree
interrogation techniques. See PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFoRCEmNT & THE AD-
MIN. OF JuSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY 93 (1967) (stating that
following publication of the Wickersham reports, the Supreme Court issued several rulings
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I. The Impact of Federalization on the
Federal Justice System
A. The Dimensions of Federalization
The federalization of American criminal law is a multifaceted
phenomenon. It has a snowballing effect. Enforcement of criminal
laws requires resources at every step of the way-police officers to
investigate and apprehend suspects, prosecutors to bring them to jus-
tice, public defenders to represent the indigent, court reporters to rec-
ord hearings, trial judges to preside over the proceedings72 and
sentence convicted defendants, probation officers to prepare presen-
tencing reports and supervise unincarcerated offenders, appellate
judges to hear criminal appeals, an entire prison system to house con-
victed offenders and defendants awaiting trial, a parole board to de-
termine when an offender is ready for early release, a commission to
establish sentencing guidelines, and specialized bureaucracies for spe-
cialized crimes73 and crime-fighting programs. 74
B. The Federal Prison System
The practical impact of the penchant to federalize crime is no-
where better illustrated than in the story of our federal prisons. In the
1800s the federal role in criminal law enforcement was so minor that,
with the exception of facilities for miscreant soldiers and sailors, the
excluding involuntary confessions from evidence, causing the demise of the third degree);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,445-47 (1967) (relying in part on the Wickersham report
in finding that limits must be placed on custodial interrogations to eliminate the third
degree).
Barry Goldwater gave a tough-on-crime acceptance speech at the 1964 Republican
National Convention, noting the rise in violent street crime and the commensurate loss of
personal safety. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 274. The implicit message, of course, was
that the federal government should do something about it.
Lyndon Johnson, who won the election, picked up on the theme, establishing a Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice and urging Congress to
create the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Id. Ten years and $6.6
billion later, the "national" crime problem was still booming. Indeed, the crime rate had
increased by 54%. Federal Assistance to State and Local Criminal Justice Agencies: Hear-
ings on S. 1245, S. 1882, S. 3270, and S. 3280 Before the Subcomrn. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 1, 2 (1978)
(remarks of Senator Biden) [hereinafter Federal Assistance to Agencies].
72. Including prisoners' habeas corpus and civil rights proceedings.
73. E.g., the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, Organized Crime Strike Forces, and the Environmental Crimes and Public Integ-
rity Sections of the Justice Department.
74. Most notably, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which dispensed
more than $6 billion to the states for strategic crime-fighting initiatives in its first 10 years.
Federal Assistance to Agencies, supra note 71, at 2.
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government did not operate a single prison until the end of the cen-
tury.75 Instead, it boarded federal prisoners at state and local jails at
very little expense.76 In 1887, however, Congress made it illegal for
states to contract out the labor of federal prisoners housed in their
jails.77 Responding in kind, the states began imposing per diem
charges for each federal prisoner they held,78 which in turn provided
the incentive to establish a federal prison system.
As had been true of early congressional forays into substantive
criminal law, the beginnings were modest and cautious. The govern-
ment opened its first prison in 1895 and added two more in the early
1900s. 79 Those three facilities composed the sum total of the federal
prison "system" until 1925.80 But the number of federal prisoners to
be housed was also modest-fewer than 2,000 in 1890 and about 3,000
by 1915.81 A comparison of state and federal prison populations in
1910 confirms that these figures represent a mere drop in the bucket.
State penal facilities housed more than 35 times more prisoners (more
than 66,000) than federal facilities held (a mere 1,900).82
Then came a watershed year. Congress presaged the growth of a
true prison system when it ushered in the Federal Bureau of Prisons in
1930.83 Between then and 1989, the number of federal prisons rose
from 5 to 47,84 and the federal prison population grew from 13,0008
75. FRmDMA, supra note 19, at 269. The first federal prison was originally a military
fort, Fort Leavenworth, in Kansas.
76. Id. In January 1877 federal prisoners accounted for half of the 50 inmates in the
Alameda County jail in California. Id.
77. Id




81. Id at 270.
82. Id
83. Id. at 269. The Bureau was located within the Department of Justice.
In addition to authorizing physical facilities to house federal prisoners, the legislation
establishing the Bureau authorized the Attorney General to "establish and conduct indus-
tries, farms, and other activities; to classify the inmates, and to provide for their proper
treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation." Id
In 1934 Congress created Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a wholly-owned government
corporation, to employ and train federal inmates and to sell products and services to other
federal agencies. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1995, app. at 602
[hereinafter 1995 Budget]. Throughout its history, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., has been
self-sustaining. It has never required any appropriation to offset deficits and has, to date,
generated $82 million of excess income that has been returned to the federal treasury. Id
84. FkIxDMAN, supra note 19, at 270.
85. Id. These were nonmilitary prisoners. There were an additional 13,000 military
prisoners in 1930. By 1940 the number of nonmilitary prisoners had reached 20,000. Id.
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to more than 53,000.86 Within the next five years alone, the number of
federal correctional facilities nearly doubled. 87 But the demand for
more prison space is endless. The Bureau is slated to open nine new
prisons in 199588 and to begin construction or construction planning at
three other sites89 to relieve overcrowding and accommodate addi-
tional anticipated increases in the prison population. The system will
house on average more than 92,000 offenders in facilities it controls in
1995.90 In addition, an average of more than 10,500 sentenced federal
offenders will be housed in state and local jails and other contract
facilities. 91
The federal prison system is a seemingly bottomless pit. It is the
vortex of a self-perpetuating cycle in which an ever increasing number
of federal offenders are placed (and will continue to be placed) in an
ever increasing number of federal, state, and local penal facilities.
How did we reach this sorry state of affairs?
C. Who Are These Federal Offenders?
(1) The Government's War on Drugs
The federal government's "war on drugs" is the single most sig-
nificant contributor to this self-perpetuating cycle. The drug war has
skewed the federal criminal (and civil) justice system at every possible
level. The question is whether the government will heed its lesson.
The first major push to eradicate drug trafficking was the Harri-
son Narcotic Drug Act, which was passed in 1914.92 The Act regu-
86. Id.
87. See 1995 Budget, supra note 83, at 600. The Budget appropriation contemplates
the operation of 89 correctional facilities in 1995. Id. Whether this figure includes the nine
new prisons to be opened that year and the jointly run contract facility is not entirely clear.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text. Cf. Francis X. Clines, A Futuristic Prison Awaits
the Hardcore 400, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at Al (describing a new federal maximum
security facility specially equipped to handle the system's most violent and disruptive
prisoners).
88. 1995 Budget, supra note 83, at 600. These nine facilities will add about 9,700 beds
to the system. In addition, the Bureau jointly operates a new 1,000 bed contract facility
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id.
89. Id. at 601-02. In addition to its central office in Washington, the Bureau of Prisons
has six regional offices and three staff training centers. Id. at 600.
90. Id. According to current projections, the prison population will reach 130,000 by
the year 2000. U.S. DEP'T OF Jusnc-, AN ANALYSIS OF NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS
wrrH MINIMAL CRIMINAL HISTORIES 13 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF DRUG
OFFENDERS].
91. 1995 Budget, supra note 83, at 600.
92. Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). For a more detailed account, see Thomas M. Quinn &
Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control Legislation, 22 CAT-. U.L.
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lated the production and use of opium and coca leaves and their
derivatives.93 The Harrison Act was followed by the Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act of 1922,94 which added cocaine to the list of
prohibited drugs. The Marijuana Tax Act of 193795 enlarged the class
of controlled substances to include marijuana. Then came the Opium
Poppy Control Act,96 which forbade unlicensed persons from growing
opium poppies; a 1946 law that made synthetic opiates like methadone
subject to the laws governing opium;97 the Narcotic Manufacturing
Act of 1960,98 which established a licensing system for narcotic drug
manufacturers; and 1965 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,99 which focused on dangerous drugs like hallucinogens,
barbiturates, and tranquilizers.
Congress overhauled this unwieldy patchwork of drug statutes in
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970.100 The Act classifies substances that had previously been de-
fined as narcotics and dangerous drugs into five categories of con-
trolled substances, based upon their potential for abuse and the extent
of their accepted medical use.10 ' The Act criminalizes manufacturing,
distributing, dispensing, and possessing controlled substances in viola-
tion of its comprehensive regulatory scheme.'02
A decade and a half later Congress took a no-holds-barred ap-
proach to drug crimes in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,103 which
increased penalties and instituted mandatory minimum sentences for
REv. 586 (1973). One common thread in the pre-1970 drug trafficking statutes was their
imposition of heavy taxes on the drugs themselves.
93. Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
94. Ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596 (1922).
95. Ch. 553, 50 Stat 551 (1937).
96. Ch. 720, 56 Stat. 1045 (1942).
97. Act of Mar. 8, 1946, ch. 81, 60 Stat. 38.
98. Pub. L. No. 86-429, 74 Stat. 55 (1960).
99. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74,79 Stat. 226 (1965).
100. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801
to 971 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The jurisdictional base for this legislation is the Commerce
Clause. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6) (1988) (finding that a major portion of the traffic in
controlled substances flows through interstate commerce, that local distribution and pos-
session of controlled substances contribute to the volume of interstate traffic in them, and
that it is impossible to differentiate between controlled substances manufactured and dis-
tributed intrastate and those manufactured and distributed interstate).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988).
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988).
103. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801
to 971 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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most drug offenses. 10 4 The penalties are severe.10 5 A first time of-
fender who is convicted of manufacturing, distributing, or possessing
for distribution 100 kilograms of marijuana, for example, is subject to
a mandatory minimum prison term of five years.106 A first time of-
fender convicted of a like offense involving one kilogram of heroin or
five kilograms of cocaine will receive a mandatory term of at least ten
years. 107 If the offender has two or more prior state and/or federal
felony drug convictions, the penalty is a mandatory term of life
imprisonment. 08
(2) Fighting the War on Drugs
Enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 signaled the government's resolve to eradicate
drug trafficking in this country. By 1973 drug enforcement had as-
sumed such importance that it required a new bureaucracy, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).10 9 Its mission is to restrict the
supply of controlled substances through coordination with state, local,
and other federal authorities. It seeks to immobilize major drug traf-
ficking operations to the maximum extent possible and to prevent the
104. Id. Congress even imposed mandatory minimum sentences (albeit relatively light
ones) for simple possession. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988).
But in a surprising digression from its relentless drive to increase the severity of
sentences, in the 1994 Crime Bill Congress authorized sentencing courts to impose less
than the statutory mandatory minimum for some nonviolent drug crimes committed by
defendants with relatively minor criminal histories. Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)).
105. Generally, the severity of the penalty is linked to the quantity of the controlled
substance involved.
106. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The maximum term for this offense is forty years. Id.
107. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). The maximum sentence for these offenses is life imprison-
ment. In both instances, the mandatory minimum is raised to twenty years if death or
bodily injury ensues. Id. These mandatory penalties for first-time drug offenders are more
severe than "sentences typically meted out to first-time robbers or rapists." Steven Wisot-
sky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
889, 904 (1987).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
109. When the Harrison Act was passed, enforcement authority was vested in the nar-
cotics division of the Prohibition unit of the Internal Revenue Service. A little over a
decade later, the division was absorbed into the new Prohibition Bureau of the Treasury
Department. By 1930 narcotics enforcement had been transferred to a newly created sepa-
rate agency, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which was still located in the Treasury De-
partment. Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 92, at 599. In 1968 this Bureau and the Drug
Abuse Control Bureau of the FDA were consolidated into the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, a Justice Department agency ld. at 605-06.
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diversion of legally produced controlled substances into illicit
channels." 0
Although the DEA remained the lead enforcement agency, the
drug war's "insatiable appetite for resources and power""' led to the
proliferation of overlapping enforcement efforts by uncoordinated
and uncooperative agencies. The problem became so serious by 1990
that Congress began adding special appropriations for Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement (OCDE) to the federal budget." 2 The
OCDE is designed to coordinate the enforcement activities of the
DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), the United States Marshals Service,
the United States Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the United
States Coast Guard.113 By any account, that is an awesome list of fed-
eral police forces to assign to a common beat.
As the war on drugs escalated, federal enforcement efforts took
on international dimensions. The DEA entered the realm of foreign
investigations in an effort to gather intelligence about narcotics pro-
duction and trafficking and to disrupt the production of controlled
substances destined for the United States as close to the source as
possible. Toward that end, the agency began assigning agents to for-
eign countries, principally in South America.
114
Because much of the illicit drug supply comes from other coun-
tries, drug interdiction at the most vulnerable borders of the United
States inevitably became an integral part of the enforcement scheme.
But since the South American DEA operations could not shut down
illicit production and exportation of drugs and the Customs Service
and the INS could not make United States borders impervious to il-
110. 1995 Budget, supra note 83, at 594.
111. Wisotsky, supra note 107, at 922.
112. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 36. By 1994 the appropriation for this program
alone was well over $350 million.
113. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-36. If the Founding Fathers did not contem-
plate a national police power, see supra text accompanying notes 14-17, they would surely
be astonished by all of these federal police forces.
114. In 1992, 343 DEA special agents were assigned to 74 offices located in 50 foreign
countries. Tim WHrE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, A NATION RE-
SPONDS TO DRUG USE, BUDGET SUMMARY 92 (Jan. 1992). The DEA's 1993 budget re-
quest included funding for an additional 53 special agents and 13 technical personnel to
assign to Latin America in conjunction with the Andean Strategy. ld. at 93.
See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 39 (expressing concern that in addition to
agents permanently assigned to Bolivia and Peru to conduct Operation SNOWCAP, the
DEA had temporarily deployed 70 agents to support that operation).
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licit importation of controlled substances, it "logically" followed that
the DEA should try to catch the traffickers in between. Hence,
United States drug interdiction on the high seas.115
But the Coast Guard was ill-equipped to handle the job alone.
Thus, Congress militarized civilian law enforcement in 1981 by al-
lowing the armed services to supply equipment and personnel in aid of
the cause. 116 The Department of Defense has provided pursuit
planes, helicopters, and other equipment to civilian agencies, and the
Navy has used sophisticated radar planes to patrol coastal areas. In-
deed, Navy vessels, including a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, have
played a role in the interdiction effort.
117
With the war on drugs thus in high gear, it would be fair to say
that "drug enforcement became the top priority, indeed the organiz-
ing focus, of the entire federal criminal justice system.""18 Despite
115. See Wisotsky, supra note 107, at 892-94.
116. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military from engaging in civilian law en-
forcement activities. 18 U.S.C. § 1385. But 1981 amendments to Title 10 of the United
States Code permitted the military to gather intelligence and supply equipment and per-
sonnel at the request of law enforcement officials who have jurisdiction over drug and
immigration offenses. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378. The Defense Drug Interdiction Assist-
ance Act later enlarged the military's authority to provide resources for drug interdiction.
10 U.S.C. § 371 et seq.
Some members of Congress wanted direct military participation in drug enforcement
efforts, while others only wanted the military to play a backup role. At one point, a House
bill to enhance international interdiction contained a provision that would have imposed a
45-day deadline on the President to "substantially halt the unlawful penetration of United
States borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics." H.R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 208(b) (1986).
117. Wisotsky, supra note 107, at 893. The Navy deployed a task force of 69 ships in
Central American waters in 1983. George Stein, Naval Task Force Enlists in Drug War,
MIAMi HERALD, Aug. 24, 1983, at 13A. And for the first time in recent history, a Navy
destroyer fired upon a civilian vessel, all in pursuit of the interdiction effort. Liz
Balmaseda, Navy Bullets Riddle Pot-Smuggling Ship, MIAMI HERALD, July 17, 1983, at Al.
Cf. U.S. Warships May Join Drug Battle Off Colombia, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1989, at A27
(describing a proposal to deploy warships to the Colombian coast); Melissa Healy, Navy
May Send Ships to Fight Colombia Drugs, L.A. TiMEs, Nov. 23, 1989, at Al (same);
Michael Isikoff, Civil Air Patrol Enlists in Drug War, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1989, at A17
(describing the deployment of 3,000 Civil Air Patrol pilots to fly "noncombat" missions for
the Air Force to identify cannabis plants); J. Frazier Smith, National Guard Units Enlist in
Drug War, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 1989, at 1A (reporting that the states will share $40
million in federal funds appropriated to finance the participation of National Guard units
in the drug war).
118. Wisotsky, supra note 107, at 898. The drive to escalate the war on drug traffickers
reached a new level of mean spiritedness in the proposed Arctic Penitentiary Act of 1982,
which would have established a prison facility in Alaska for federal and state offenders
convicted, inter alia, of distributing narcotics to a person under 21 years of age. All offend-
ers sentenced to the Arctic Penitentiary would have served a term of life without parole.
H.R. 7112, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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these extraordinary efforts, the drug problem is very much with us
today. But the allocation of all of these resources to federal drug en-
forcement has nonetheless produced dramatic effects.
Between 1974 and 1990, for example, while the total number of
federal criminal defendants rose slightly less than seventeen percent,
the number of drug defendants increased more than seventy-five per-
cent.119 During that same time the total number of federal criminal
convictions rose nearly twenty-nine percent, while the number of drug
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Source: FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1986 THROUGH 1990, at 25.
The data for the period between 1980 and 1990 is even more dra-
matic. While the overall rate of criminal cases filed in United States
District Courts rose just sixty-nine percent during that decade, the
number of drug cases increased nearly three hundred percent.1
21
119. FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1986 THROUGH 1990, at 25.
120. Id.
121. In his 1989 Year-End Report, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that in some dis-
tricts, drug cases constitute almost two-thirds of all new criminal filings. Hon. William H.
Rehnquist, 1989 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 4, reprinted in T-m TnmD BRANCH (Ad-
ministrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1990, at 1. Cf Michael Tackett, Drug War
Chokes Federal Courts; Assembly-line Justice Perils Legal System, Cm. TRm., Oct. 14, 1990,
at 1 (the seven federal district judges in the Western District of Texas handle more than
three times the national average of cases and nearly triple the average number of trials;
between 1988 and 1989 the District experienced an 80% increase in the number of drug
defendants).
Thus, even if new drug offenders step in to take their place,1 22 federal
drug enforcement efforts have succeeded in getting an unprecedented
number of drug traffickers and users off the streets.
(3) The Price of Good Intentions
As might have been expected, the results are not cost free. In
addition to consuming a tremendous outlay of resources, the drug war
has had an insidious effect on the federal justice system. The influx of
thousands of new drug prosecutions attributable to this remarkable
enforcement effort threatens to overwhelm the federal courts.123 In
the local District of Columbia courts, for example, felony drug prose-
cutions rose five hundred percent in four years, and felony drug con-
victions rose more than six hundred fifty percent. 24
When courts are compelled to absorb so much so quickly, what
would otherwise be ripple effects become major dislocations. Adding
all of these cases to the courts' dockets compels judges to reallocate
the way they use their time in countless important ways. For example,
the Speedy Trial Act requires that courts give criminal cases prior-
ity.' 25 Thus, if drug cases are not handled expeditiously, they face dis-
missal.126 But giving thousands of drug cases priority must be done at
the expense of civil justice, which becomes a casualty of the war on
drugs. 27 That, in turn, diminishes respect for the courts and prevents
122. In the view of one commentator:
The publicized conviction of a drug dealer, by instantly creating a vacancy in the
lucrative drug market, has the same effect as hanging up a help-wanted sign say-
ing, "drug dealer needed-5,000 a week to start-exciting work."
Patricia M. Wald, A Report from the Front in the War on Drugs, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 2
(1990) (quoting The War on Drugs: Is It Time to Surrender?, 9 INST. PINL. & PUB. POL'Y 1,
4 (1989)).
123. Id. at 4. See also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMm. 35 (1990)
[hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY] (stating that "[t]he federal courts' most pressing
problems ... stem from unprecedented numbers of federal narcotics prosecutions").
124. Wald, supra note 122, at 5.
125. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988).
126. "At some point, the war on drugs will be a casualty of itself. Overload causes
backlog. Backlog threatens timely prosecution and, under the Speedy Trial Act, can lead
to dismissals." FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 123, at 36.
127. Id. The Federal Courts Study Committee found that some districts with particu-
larly large drug dockets are "virtually unable to try civil cases" and that the situation will
only worsen in the future. Id. See also Tackett, supra note 121 (describing a major envi-
ronmental case filed by the state of Florida in June 1986 that had not been tried by Octo-
ber 1990 because the criminal caseload crowded it off of the trial calendar). The average
time it took for federal civil cases to go to trial increased from 18 to 21 months between
1991 and 1992. Robert R. Raven, Don't Wage War on Crime in Federal Courts, THE RE-
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them from performing important and historical roles.128
The problem is exacerbated by the piling on of mandatory mini-
mum sentencesY29 Historically, eighty-five to ninety percent of fed-
eral criminal cases are resolved through plea bargains. 130 But a drug
defendant who faces a lengthy mandatory minimum prison term has
little incentive to negotiate a guilty plea, even if the prospect of ac-
quittal is dim. Thus, it is not just the volume of new drug filings that
burdens the courts. It is the reality that a high percentage of them
result in jury trials.131
The impact of these drug filings on the court system is not limited
to the trial court level. While the total number of criminal appeals in
the federal system rose about one hundred thirty percent between
CORDER, Aug. 11, 1992, at 8. In districts with high criminal caseloads, the delay can be
much longer. Id
128. "The careful and considered decisions courts should be making about societal pro-
tection and individual liberties will be drowned in a sea of drug arrests." Wald, supra note
122, at 6.
129. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. Although more than 60 statutes
impose mandatory minimum sentences, few are actually used in practice. Approximately
94% of all mandatory minimum terms are imposed under four statutes: 21 U.S.C. § 841
(manufacture and distribution of controlled substances); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (possession of
controlled substances); 21 U.S.C. § 960 (importing or exporting controlled substances); and
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possessing a firearm during a drug or violent crime). Fewer than half
of the 60 statutes were ever invoked between 1984 and 1989. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CauiNAL JusTICE SYSTEM 10 (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter SENTENCING REPORT]. Notwith-
standing that fact, nearly 60,000 defendants were sentenced to mandatory minimum
sentences during roughly that same period. Id at 13.
A recent survey revealed that more than 50% of appellate judges and nearly 70% of
district judges strongly support the repeal of most, if not all, mandatory minimum
sentences. Judges Irked by Tough-on-Crime Laws, ABA J., Oct. 1994, at 18.
130. Wald, supra note 122, at 9.
131. FEDERAL Coutrs STUDY, supra note 123, at 36. The Courts Study Committee
found that drug cases account for some 44 percent of federal criminal trials and that most
of them are jury trials. Id. See also SEMENCING REPORT, supra note 129, at 93-103 (of
judges expressing negative comments about mandatory minimums, "result in more trials"
was the third most frequent criticism; among Assistant U.S. Attorneys with negative views,
that was by far the most frequent criticism; among defense attorneys who had unfavorable
views, that was a close second to "too harsh"). See also a at 57-60 for an analysis of case
processing when the underlying conduct fits within the mandatory minimum statute.
The district courts are further burdened by federal Sentencing Guidelines, which also
disrupt the plea negotiation process, see Wald, supra note 122, at 9; FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY, supra note 123, at 137, and add to the length of plea and sentencing hearings, see
FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY, supra note 123, at 137. Federal district judges surveyed by the
Federal Courts Study Committee reported that since the Guidelines went into effect, guilty
plea and sentencing hearings consume 25 to 100 percent more time than did pre-guideline
hearings. Half of the judges surveyed reported that the Guidelines had contributed to a
decrease in the percentage of guilty pleas. Id
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1974 and 1990, the number of drug appeals more than tripled.132 Drug
cases now account for almost fifty-five percent of all criminal appeals.
Thus, whereas the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals pre-
viously spent five percent of its time on criminal cases, it now devotes
twenty-five percent of its time to drug cases alone.
133
132. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUsTICE STATISTICS 557 (1991); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 450 (1987). The Supreme Court
seems to be the only court unaffected by the priority federal officials have accorded drug
enforcement. Although the number of petitions for review increased 35% between 1974
and 1990, the number of criminal petitions increased slightly less than 7%. The number of
criminal petitions actually granted by the Court declined nearly 39%. U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 559
(1991); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 603 (1975).
133. Wald, supra note 122, at 5. A high percentage of criminal appeals are Sentencing
Guideline appeals. In its infinite wisdom, Congress provided for appeals of sentences by
both the government and the defendant to resolve disputes about whether the trial judge
misapplied or made an unwarranted departure from the applicable guideline rule. 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b). Cf. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 36 (1973) ("I have not yet mentioned the worst spectre of all-appellate review of
sentences.... I would hope there will be enough good judgment in Congress to realize
that adoption of such a measure would administer the coup de grdce to the courts of ap-
peals as we know them.").
Although the appellate courts have yet to succumb, Sentencing Guideline appeals
have added a significant burden to their dockets. While the total number of criminal ap-
peals is rising steadily, the increase is attributable entirely to the Guidelines. The number
of non-Guideline appeals decreased from 5,700 in 1988 to just under 1,700 in 1991. During
that same time, the number of Guideline appeals increased from 225 to 8,200. Thus, in
1991, more than 80% of the nearly 10,000 criminal appeals were Guideline appeals. AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECrOR 83
tbl. 3 (1991).
FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS




Year Appeals Appeals Appeals
1988 6,012 5,787 225
1989 8,020 3,608 4,412
1990 9,493 2,174 7,319
1991 9,949 1,690 8,259
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Source: U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREnAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTIC-1991, at 557; -1987, at 450.
If the war on drugs has threatened the quality of civil and crimi-
nal justice in the courts, its effect on prison populations has been "cat-
aclysmic.' Between 1980 and 1990, the federal prison population
134. Wald, supra note 122, at 8. Sixty-five percent of federal prisoners are incarcerated
for drug offenses. ANALYSIS OF DRUG OFFENDERS, supra note 90, at 13, and more than
36% of incarcerated drug offenders are classified as low-level. kd. at 2. Notwithstanding
that low-level offenders are nonviolent and are serving their first prison term, their
sentences have risen 150% since implementation of federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
average low-level drug offender will serve at least five and three-fourths years before being
released from prison. Current data indicate that low-level offenders are not likely to be
recidivists and that the length of incarceration does not affect their recidivism rates. Id. at
2-3.
As of 1989, the federal prison system was 65% over capacity. FEDERAL BUREAU OFPRISONS, 1989 STATE OF TIE BUREAU F (1989). That same year, state prisons were operat-
ing at 25% over capacity, and "[tihirty-five jurisdictions [were] under court decrees to rem-
edy unconstitutional conditions." Wald, supra note 122, at 8.
Here, too, the federal Sentencing Guidelines put a strain on the system. They gener-
ally increase the length of incarceration and "make no concessions to prison overcrowd-
ing." Id at 9. Thus, the overcrowding problem is itself a self-perpetuating cycle.
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more than doubled. 135 Between 1990 and 1995, it almost doubled
again.136 Something is out of control.
Figure 3
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Source: 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 343, at 210.
135. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CIMI-
NAL JusTICE STATISTICS 1982, at 536 tbl. 6.27 (reporting a 1980 prison population of nearly
24,000); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 628 tbl. 6.64 (reporting a 1990 prison population of more
than 65,000).
136. Although this Article will be published before the 1995 year-end figures are avail-
able, projected increases in the federal prison population over this period range from about
80 to 90%. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, at 621
tbl. 6.68 (projecting a 1995 prison population of roughly 104,000) with Theresa Walker
Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional
Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 418 (1991) (projecting a
1995 prison population of nearly 117,000).
The impact of the drug war on the prison system is not limited to sheer numbers of
prisoners. It affects the composition of prison populations as well. The impact of drug
enforcement on the prison system began to emerge by the late twenties, when prison ad-
ministrators were confronted by large numbers of addicts in the prison population. Con-
gress addressed this problem in the Porter Act, ch. 82, 45 Stat. 1085 (1929), which
established two narcotics farms to treat addicts. A facility located in Lexington, Kentucky
was opened in 1935, and one located in Fort Worth, Texas began operations in 1938. Quinn
& McLaughlin, supra note 92, at 599.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons now offers drug treatment programs for inmates in
each of its facilities and plans to expand those programs. The budget for treatment pro-
grams rose from $2.25 to $6 million between 1989 and 1990. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, at 665
tbl. 6.102.
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D. Why Are These Offenders in the Federal System?
In view of the priority that drug enforcement receives at the fed-
eral level, the magnitude of the enforcement efforts and the resulting
dislocation of resources, one might assume that the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is demonstrably more effective or efficient than state law
enforcement. To the extent that particular offenses have interstate or
international characteristics, that would surely be true. The states lack
jurisdiction to pursue the malefactor beyond their borders.
But can the same be said of run-of-the-mill drug crimes? A re-
view of the record reveals that prosecutorial practices in small drug
cases vary widely from district to district. In the Southern District of
California in 1992, for example, federal prosecutors obtained two hun-
dred convictions for simple possession. Those cases represented four-
teen percent of the court's caseload that year. In contrast, in the
neighboring Central District of California, prosecutors obtained only
two convictions for simple possession.137 In a bizarre turn of events,
the Southern District of New York observes the practice of designat-
ing one day each week as "federal day."'138 Everyone who is arrested
for a drug offense by the local police on that day is charged with a
federal rather than state drug crime.' 39 And in another district, al-
most every case involving crack cocaine is prosecuted in federal
court.14o
Moreover, some of these drug trials do not resemble true federal
trials. Although the presiding judge and the criminal statute under
which the defendant is charged are federal, a state prosecutor who has
been designated as a federal prosecutor may try the case, and all of
137. Selected Criminal Justice and Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION
ANNUAL REPORT 178, 180 app. B (1992) (by district).
138. Rudolph Giuliani implemented the federal day initiative when he was the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Katherine Bishop, Mandatory
Sentences in Drug Cases; Is the Law Defeating Its Purpose?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1990, at
B16. The dual purposes of the initiative are to ease the workload of overburdened state
criminal courts and to send a strong deterrence message through stiffer federal sentences.
Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al.
139. Sara Sun Beale, Report on Federal Criminal Caseload/Scope of Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMTrTEE, SUBCOMMIrEE ON WORKLOAD
WORKING PAPER at 7 (1990) [hereinafter Beale, Report].
Senator Biden introduced legislation that would have created a national federal day
each month to bring all locally arrested drug offenders into the federal system. Bishop,
supra note 138, at B16.
140. Beale, Report, supra note 139, at 7.
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the witnesses the prosecution calls may be state and local law enforce-
ment officials. 141
What is gained by federalizing these crimes? The federal courts
are literally flooded with minor drug cases. 142 Yet the states are
scarcely unable or unwilling to act. Since the 1970s the states have
experienced a parallel increase in drug enforcement activity. In 1988
state law enforcement officers made more than one million drug traf-
ficking arrests. 143 That same year more than 100,000 defendants were
convicted on state drug trafficking charges. 144 In 1992 nearly a third
of all state felony convictions were for drug crimes. 145
Although the increase in drug arrests puts a strain on state prose-
cutors' offices, there is no evidence that they are functioning less ef-
fectively. In fact, in some instances there is evidence to the contrary.
A survey of state prosecutors in high drug arrest areas revealed that
many responded by developing new and innovative programs for
managing heavy drug caseloads.
Consider, for example, drug arrest dispositions for Los Angeles,
Manhattan, San Diego, and Washington, D.C. for the years 1982 and
1987. In all four cities-all of which experienced a significant increase
in drug trafficking and use in the mid-1980s when crack cocaine ap-
peared-the prosecutors responded by indicting a higher percentage
of defendants arrested for felony drug crimes.1"'
141. Id.
142. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 123, at 36.
143. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1989, at 418.
144. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, at 544 tbl. 5.46.
STATE AND FEDERAL CONVICTIONS




U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE
PROCESSING 1982-91, wrH PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 1992, at 13 tbl. 9 (1993); U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 1990,
at 2 tbl. 1 (1993); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 1992, at 2 tbl. 1 (1995).
145. State Drug Felonies Hit 31% of '92 Tota4 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1995, at A6.
146. BARBARA BOLAND & KERRY M. HEALEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSE TO
HEAVY DRUG CASELOADS: COMPREHENSIVE PROBLEM-REDUCTION STRATEGIES 1 (1993)
[hereinafter HEAVY DRUG CASELOADS]. See also JAN CHAIKEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
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Although the increase in the number of felony arrests was dra-
matic, the number of felony drug convictions was disproportionately
higher. And the judges who sentenced drug defendants imposed
prison terms at the same or a greater frequency than they had in the
past. In consequence, although felony drug arrests increased one hun-
dred thirty-six percent over the five-year period, the number of drug
felons sentenced to prison increased by three hundred seventeen per-
cent. Thus, those arrested for drug felonies in 1987 were more than
twice as likely to go to prison as those arrested in 1982.147
If the states are enforcing their laws, and it seems that they are,
why are so many small drug cases made matters of federal concern?
Why is the federal government duplicating state drug enforcement ef-
forts, inundating federal courts with cases that could (and should) be
tried in state courts?148
There are no simple answers, but it is possible to identify some
contributing factors. As an initial matter, federal criminal dockets
have been "more subject to the changing winds of politics, to fashions
and movements" than those of the states.149 Although historically
state criminal dockets reflect a steady flow of assault, burglary, theft,
and kindred crimes, the federal docket is "all fits and starts.1 5 o
Prohibition swelled federal dockets in the early part of the cen-
tury. Between 1921 and 1933, more than (and in some years well
over) half of the cases on the criminal docket were Prohibition prose-
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INs'rrUTE OF JUSTICE, MULTIURIS-
DICriONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: REDUCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND
(1990) (describing various collaborative approaches to combat drug abuse).
147. HEAVY DRUG CASELOADS, supra note 146, at 1. This is not to suggest that state
criminal justice systems are immune from the problems besetting the federal system. They
are undeniably inundated, in large measure because of drug enforcement and mandatory
minimum sentences. See Richard C. Rubin, Get-Tough Stance Draws Fiscal Criticism,
ABA J., Jan. 1995, at 16. That does not mean, however, that more federalization of state
crimes is the optimal (or even a desirable) solution. But cf. Long-Range Plan Would Cut
Federal Cases, ABA J., Feb. 1995, at 22,24 (Judge Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of New York
state, says that "[a] solution that eases the burden on the federal courts without taking into
account the effect on the state court system is no solution at all.").
148. Cf. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 123, at 37 ("The federal system must not
be overwhelmed with cases that could be prosecuted in the state courts."). But cf. id
(dissenting statement of Mr. Dennis, joined by Congressman Moorhead) ("The federal
judiciary must not shrink from its critical responsibility" to persuade Congress to provide
an adequate number of judges to try federal drug cases.).
For an idea of just how extensively federal and state controlled substances laws over-
lap, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JuSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY LAWS
OF TR 50 STATES AND THE Disricr OF COLUMBIA (1986).
149. FRmDMAN, supra note 19, at 268.
150. Id
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cutions. The number of Prohibition cases peaked in 1932 when nearly
66,000 prosecutions were commenced. 151 When Prohibition fell by
the wayside, other concerns of the day stepped in to take its place.
Auto theft, which later constituted the largest single category of fed-
eral criminal cases, waned as a pressing concern by 1973, when an
enormous increase in the number of narcotics cases had occurred.
Thus, federal criminal law "has been more ancillary, less fundamental
in its focus"'1 52 than has the law of the states.
A closely related factor is what Congress has chosen to criminal-
ize.' 53 Many federal criminal statutes overlap with or merely dupli-
cate state law prohibitions unrelated to any substantial federal
interest.
54
151. Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoBs. 494, 497 (1933-34). The total number of federal prosecutions in 1932
was just over 92,000. Id.
Between 1913 and 1932, the peak of Prohibition enforcement, federal police protec-
tion costs rose tenfold, while total federal governmental expenditures rose only about four-
fold. Baker, supra note 20, at 583-84 n.437. With the demise of Prohibition, federal police
expenditures dropped in 1936 to little more than half of what they had been in 1931, while
overall federal expenditures nearly doubled. Id.
The only category of prosecutions that competed briefly with Prohibition cases were
war cases (Le., prosecutions involving selective service, trading with the enemy, and the
like), which peaked in 1920 at almost 20,000, compared with 72,000 Prohibition prosecu-
tions. Rubin, supra, at 496.
152. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 268.
153. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 opens a new chap-
ter on federalization issues. The Act federalizes drive-by shootings in furtherance of a
major drug offense. Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 6008 (1994). But drive-by shooting is a matter
of federal interest only if the actor shoots into a crowd of two or more people. The Act
also federalizes participating in a criminal street gang whose members engage in a continu-
ing series of offenses-including serious federal or state controlled substances felonies and
federal or state violent felonies. Id. § 150001.
154. The federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993), is the quintessen-
tial example. The statute was enacted in response to a vicious auto theft in Maryland in
which a woman was dragged to her death by her car after her arm became tangled in her
seatbelt outside the car. Although the crime received national media attention, it was
otherwise purely local. Local authorities successfully apprehended, convicted, and sen-
tenced the offenders to life imprisonment. Graciela Sevilla, Basu's Slayer Sentenced to Life
Without Parole, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1993, at B1; Graciela Sevilla, Basu Case Defendant
Gets Life; Judge Cites Fatal Carjacking's Legacy of "Distrust, Fear and Rage," WASH. POST,
June 30, 1993, at B1; Senate Passes Carjacking Bil Sends It to Bush, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1992, at A24 [hereinafter Carjacking Bill].
Yet Congress felt compelled to express its outrage by expanding federal jurisdiction to
criminalize carjacking. Cf. Carjacking Bill supra (Rep. Charles E. Schumer, chief author
of the bill, remarked that "[w]hen it comes to stealing cars, it's no longer for the Saturday
night joy ride.... It's men armed with screwdrivers, crowbars and guns terrorizing Ameri-
can motorists."). Two years later, Congress flexed its muscles again, authorizing the death
penalty for carjackings in which someone is killed. Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1796, 1970 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3)).
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Justice Department policy also contributes to the high number of
drug cases in federal courts. 5 5 For example, while it would be appro-
priate to decline to prosecute solely because of insufficient evidence, it
would not be appropriate to decline based on any other single factor,
"absent unusual circumstances.' 56 Thus, prosecutors should not de-
cline to prosecute solely because the amount of the controlled sub-
stance involved is minuscule. That is "only one of several factors" to
be considered. 5 7 And for purposes of determining the relative effec-
tiveness of state and local prosecutions, the policy directs prosecutors
to consider state penalties for the offense, state judges' customary sen-
tencing practices, and applicable state parole eligibility standards. 58
The Justice Department's articulated policy makes it clear that
the Department takes an expansive view of its jurisdiction.'5 9 It
makes no effort to channel prosecutorial discretion toward cases that
The federal carjacking statute uses interstate commerce as its jurisdictional base. The
statute applies to the armed taking of a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped,
or received in interstate commerce (virtually all motor vehicles), by force or violence. 18
U.S.C. § 2119. Thus, the statute applies to purely intrastate crimes and expands federal
jurisdiction beyond where it is needed.
155. The United States Attorneys' Manual identifies eight factors to be considered in
deciding whether a drug case should be pursued as a federal prosecution or be referred for
state or local prosecution. They are:
(1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) degree of federal involvement; (3) effective-
ness of state and local prosecutors; (4) willingness of state or local authorities to
prosecute cases investigated primarily by federal agents; (5) amount of controlled
substances involved; (6) violator's background; (7) possibility that prosecution
will lead to disclosure of violations committed by other persons; and (8) the dis-
trict court's backlog of cases.
UNrrED STATES ATroNmEYs' MANuAL § 9-101200.
Although the policy encourages federal prosecutors to cooperate with state and local
prosecutors, it cautions them to exercise care in determining which jurisdiction is most
appropriate in view of the government's "significant responsibilities" in the drug enforce-
ment sphere. lId. F. The policy does, however, recognize that in some instances a state
prosecution would be appropriate even though substantial federal interests exist.
156. Id. I A.
157. Id.
158. Id 1 C.
159. Congress clearly encourages the view that federal law enforcement agencies
should play a major role in everyday policing. If there were any doubt on that point, the
Senate report accompanying the 1995 federal budget dispels any possible ambiguity. After
proclaiming that the country is experiencing "a law enforcement emergency," the report
urges United States Attorneys to make the restoration of 123 Assistant U.S. Attorneys'
slots, lost earlier because of a budget freeze, a top priority. That is imperative, according to
the report, "if U.S. Attorneys are to continue to prosecute America's most violent offend-
ers." SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
The budget also includes funds to support the hiring of additional FBI agents to en-
able the agency to expand its efforts against violent crime. Id. at 36. The report supports
the FBI's plans to reassign up to six hundred agents to street assignments because that
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have interstate or international dimensions, involve organized crime,
or involve large quantities of drugs. Given crowded state dockets and
generally more lenient state drug penalty provisions, "these directives
are consistent with federal prosecution of a very large number of drug
cases."' 60 Sadly, "[t]he principal factor limiting federal drug prosecu-
tions has not been theory, but rather resources.' 161
The policy's reference to state penalties and sentencing practices
suggests another dynamic at work. Prosecutors may be making deci-
sions on the basis of which jurisdiction will put the defendant in the
most disadvantageous position. 162 As noted above, penalties for state
drug offenses are relatively light when compared with their sometimes
draconian federal counterparts. Thus, the decision whether to retain
federal jurisdiction or refer the case to the state is critical.
63
Similarly, the government might choose to retain a case for fed-
eral prosecution because of more lenient federal standards governing
the issuance of search warrants, the granting of permission to engage
in electronic surveillance, and the use of informants. 164 Furthermore,
"will greatly enhance efforts to investigate violent crimes, gangs, health care fraud, drug
trafficking, and terrorism." Id. at 37.
These statements contain a bit of hyperbole. Empirically, only 5% of the more than
38,000 offenders newly committed to federal prison in 1991 were convicted of violent
crimes. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CORREC-
TIONS REPORTING PROGRAM, 1991, at 53, 55. In contrast, 30% of the more than 400,000
offenders newly committed to state prison in 1991 were convicted of violent crimes. Id. at
7, 18.
160. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS EN-
FORCEMENT 290 (2d ed. 1993).
161. Id.
162. Due process challenges to such tactics generally fall on deaf ears. In United States
v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979), the Court held that just as the defendant has no
due process right to choose which of two overlapping statutes the prosecutor must invoke,
he has no constitutional right to choose the penalty to which he is subject. That principle
has been extended in this context to the choice of forum in which the defendant will be
prosecuted. United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953, 954 (11th Cir. 1992). As long as the
prosecutor does not discriminate against any class of defendants, the decision regarding
what and where to charge lies within the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
163. In United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992), for example, two
young defendants were federally prosecuted for distributing and possessing for distribution
crack cocaine. Under federal law, they were subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of
ten years, and the probation officer calculated their respective Sentencing Guideline
ranges as 13-15 years and 15-19 years. 963 F.2d at 1342. Had they been prosecuted under
state law, they would have been subject to an indeterminate sentence of 1-15 years and,
under the state's nonbinding sentencing matrix, would likely have been sentenced to a
maximum of 18-20 months. United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (D. Utah
1990), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992).
164. See United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953, 954-55 (11th Cir. 1992).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
it has the tactical advantages of a nationwide subpoena power, con-
tempt and immunity powers, and forfeiture authority.165
Another prosecutorial practice that brings more drug cases into
the system is transferring charges originally filed in state court to fed-
eral court.166 That raises the spectre of prosecutors using the threat of
federal prosecution to coerce state defendants to accept state plea
bargains.167
There are other law enforcement strategies designed specifically
to bring state offenders into the federal system as well. In 1991, for
example, the Justice Department launched Project Triggerlock, a ma-
jor effort to use federal firearms laws against violent offenders. The
avowed purpose was to federally prosecute "[v]iolent offenders typi-
cally prosecuted in State court" in order to capitalize on the availabil-
ity of federal mandatory minimum sentences without the possibility of
parole. 68 During the first six months of the operation, more than
2,600 defendants were charged with federal firearms violations. 69
Ell. Is There Hope for the Future?
As Project Triggerlock illustrates, the impending crisis in the fed-
eral justice system is attributable to more than just drug enforcement.
It is the product of a pervasive failure to recognize that federal courts
are an exhaustible resource designed to play a specialized role in the
justice system. It is also partly a function of the federal government's
taking on a major responsibility for maintaining everyday law and or-
der. That in turn is a function of an unproven assumption that the
federal government can do a better job than the states. And it is the
result of the all too irresistible urge to do something politically
popular.
70
165. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 123, at 38 (dissenting statement of Mr. Den-
nis, joined by Congressman Moorhead).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 783 F. Supp. 507, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
167. Cf Petty Pusher Goes Out Big Time PmiA. DAILY NEws, July 17,1992, at 7 (state
drug defendant who rejected a plea bargain that would result in a sentence of four years
and who asked to go to trial was charged with a federal drug crime and was sentenced to
life without parole; the U.S. Attorney and state prosecutor said the result in this case
"should cause many more defendants, who are in fact guilty, to plead guilty in state court
to avoid [having] their cases... transferred to federal court").
168. 1991 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 19 (1991).
169. Id. The six month number almost equalled the number of defendants charged
with weapons offenses in all of 1989. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, BUREAU OF JUSnCE STATIS-
TICS, SotURcEnooK OF CRININAL JUSnCE STATISTICS 1991, at 500 tbl. 5.15.
170. Although it has been suggested that there is little, if any, political opposition to
federalizing criminal law, Baker, supra note 20, at 584, the move to federalize has some
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If the federal justice system is to function effectively and continue
to dispense justice, the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment must exercise restraint. In particular, Congress must show more
regard for the states. In enacting death penalty provisions for dozens
of crimes,171 for example, Congress chose to override the decisions of
fourteen states172 and the District of Columbia to ban capital punish-
natural opponents. The National Association of Attorneys General is concerned about the
proper balancing of state and federal jurisdiction, for example. Federal Criminal Law Revi-
sion: Hearings on H.R. 1647, H.R. 4492, H.R. 4711, H.R. 5679, & H.R. 5703 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
423, 424 (1981) (statement of Dennis Roberts, Attorney General of Rhode Island). The
Association urged Congress to operate with a presumption that favors state enforcement
of criminal law. Id.
Similarly, the National Conference of State Legislatures is concerned about needless
federal invasion of jurisdiction in areas for which states traditionally assume responsibility.
Id at 446,448 (statement of Chuck Hardwick, Vice Chairman of the Law and Justice Com-
mittee of the National Conference of State Legislatures). The Conference advocates state
retention of primary responsibility for and jurisdiction over criminal activity. Id at 447.
See also William Claiborne, States Wary of Anti-Crime Bill; Legislators Balk at Measure's
Costs, Requirements, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at All; Moore, supra note 1.
The National Conference of State Chief Justices and the Judicial Conference likewise
expressed serious concerns about the impact of the Violence Against Women Act on the
courts, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 57-58 (Mar. 12, 1991), as did Chief Justice Rehnquist. Hon. William H. Rehnquist,
1992 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 3-4, reprinted in THE THIRD BRANCH (Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1993, at 1, 2-3. See also Mark Curriden, State Court
Chiefs Flex New Muscle, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at Al (the Conference of Chief Justices,
through the National Center for State Courts, briefed key congressional committee mem-
bers on their concerns about the Crime Bill; the federal government is trying to exercise
too much control and influence over state criminal justice administration).
The Justice Department took issue with several provisions of the Crime Bill, including
the D'Amato proposal to federalize most state crimes committed with a gun, see infra note
183, and the broadly worded street gang provision. Jamie S. Gorelick, Luncheon Address
(May 20, 1994), reprinted in American Law Institute, Remarks and Addresses at the 71st
Annual Meeting 69, 80 (1994) [hereinafter Gorelick Address].
FBI Director Louis Freeh also criticized the Crime Bill, which would make FBI agents
responsible for investigating drive-by shootings, domestic abuse, youth gang participation,
selling guns to juveniles, and other street crimes. These crimes are typically investigated by
state and local police whose training is different than that required to investigate complex
financial fraud and international terrorism. "Rapid, unchecked federalization of criminal
activity could overwhelm the limited resources of federal law enforcement agencies, in-
cluding the FBI," he said. FBI Criticizes Trend Toward "Federalizing"; Agents Don't Want
to Be Street Cops, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1993, at 2.
171. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, §§ 60005-60023, 108 Stat. 1796, 1970-81.
172. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISrICS BULLETIN, CAPrTAL PUN-
ISHMENT 1993, at 1 (1993). New York reinstated the death penalty in March 1995. James
Dao, Death Penalty in New York Reinstated After 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice Served, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A6.
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ment.173 Congress was clearly aware that it was at cross-purposes with
the considered policy of those states.174 Yet the demand for "tough-
ness" on crime carried the day.
Congress should also resist the temptation to view federal crimes
as interstitial gap fillers. The Violence Against Women Act, for exam-
ple, punishes crossing a state line with intent to injure or harass a
spouse or intimate partner if the actor intentionally commits a crime
of violence that injures the spouse or partner.175 After concluding
that local law is inadequate to protect women, one representative
identified an additional reason to pass the Act. "The bill also fills sig-
nificant gaps in some existing state laws," including the crime of
rape.176
173. That is especially true in the case of federal death penalty crimes that may be
committed wholly intrastate and thus do not implicate a substantial federal interest. See;
e.g., 108 Stat. 1796, 1971 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 36(b)(2)(A)) (drive-by shoot-
ings); 108 Stat. 1969 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3)) (carjacking); 108 Stat.
1969 (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)) (violent crimes in aid of racketeering); 108 Stat. 1970 (18
U.S.C. § 241) (conspiracy against rights); 108 Stat. 1970 (18 U.S.C. § 242) (deprivation of
rights under color of law); 108 Stat. 1970 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)) (fed-
erally protected activities); 108 Stat. 1973 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(i)) (gun
murders during federal crimes of violence and drug trafficking crimes).
Representative Gekas had so little regard for important state policy choices that he
offered an amendment to the 1994 Act that would have required cities and towns that
receive community-based policing grants to authorize the death penalty for defendants
convicted of killing a police officer. The amendment was killed by a voice vote. Report on
Markup of H.R. 3355, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Pub. L.
No. 103-322 approved Sept. 13,1994) in House Comm. on Judiciary, Oct. 28,1993 (markup
number 100252), available on 1994 Legi-Slate, Inc., electronic data base.
174. The statutory procedure for implementing a federal death sentence is the proce-
dure prescribed by the law of the state in which the crime occurred-unless the state has
no death penalty procedure. In that event, the court will select another state that provides
for implementation of a death sentence, and the sentence will be carried out in that state in
accordance with its procedures. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 6002 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3596). Congress also contemplated the use of state and local facilities for imple-
menting the sentence. Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3597).
175. Id. § 40221 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261). The Act also criminalizes
crossing a state line to engage in conduct that violates protective orders that relate to pro-
tection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment or bodily injury, or con-
duct that would violate the order if it were committed in the jurisdiction in which the order
was issued. Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261).
In addition, the Act creates a civil rights cause of action for victims of gender moti-
vated violence. The provision grants federal and state courts concurrent jurisdiction over
the cause of action. Id. § 40302 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981). The National
Conference of State Chief Justices criticized the Act for federalizing divorce law. Moore,
supra note 1.
176. Eleanor H. Norton, Federalizing Feminism; Protection of the Civil Rights of Wo-




Regardless of one's views on how expansively state law should
define the crime of rape, it is highly questionable whether this reason-
ing is consistent with principles of federalism. It is an overt attempt to
substitute the judgment of Congress for those of state legislatures and
courts on a matter peculiarly within the domain of the states.
Congress should also refrain from tacking on marginally relevant
jurisdictional elements to bring matters of primarily local interest into
the federal sphere. Thus, for example, Congress should avoid using
interstate commerce as a jurisdictional hook to federalize domestic
abuse 177 or invoking its power to regulate controlled substances in or-
der to federalize drive-by shootings and participation in local street
gangs. 178 Statutes such as these should be narrowly drawn to address
situations in which federal prosecutorial resources can make unique
contributions to state and local law enforcement efforts.
179
Congress should heed Chief Justice Rehnquist's warning that "we
can no longer afford the luxury of state and federal courts that work at
cross-purposes or irrationally duplicate one another.' 180 The state
and federal justice systems are interdependent, and there is a real
need to achieve a balance between their respective jurisdictions. 181
Federal courts should be viewed as "distinctive forums of limited juris-
diction, meant to complement state courts rather than supplant
177. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40221 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261). See supra note 154 and accompanying
text.
178. See supra notes 154 and 170. The issue is not whether violent crimes should be
punished. It is whether the federal system should exercise overlapping jurisdiction with the
states.
179. A draft report of the Judicial Conference's Committee on Long Range Planning
recommends that Congress should repeal existing criminal provisions that do not serve an
essential federal purpose. COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS,
DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 22 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. See infra
note 181.
180. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Report on the State of the Judiciary 2, reprinted
in THE THmRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1994, at 1, 2.
181. Id. The draft report of the Judicial Conference's Committee on Long Range Plan-
ning encourages cooperative efforts with the states to develop a policy regarding which
offenses should be prosecuted in federal courts and which in state and local courts. To
implement this recommendation, the report endorses allocating increased resources to the
states for local prosecution of offenses now prosecuted in federal court because of scarce
state resources; increased use of the practice of cross-designating state and federal prosecu-
tors to promote efficiency; and granting state courts jurisdiction over some federal crimes




them."1 2 That is true not only because of federalism principles, but
also because of the strain that expansive use of federal criminal juris-
diction puts on the system.' 8 3
But it is not only Congress that needs to exercise restraint. The
executive branch must do so as well. To swell the federal docket-and
randomly at that'84-with thousands of cases that can be handled ef-
182. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1992 Report on the State of the Judiciary, reprinted in
Trm Tsmp BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1993, at 1.
The federal court system is distinctive in several respects. Article III of the Constitu-
tion assigns federal courts a role that the states cannot play. It grants them jurisdiction
over cases arising under the Constitution, federal law, and treaties, for example. They also
have power to adjudicate all cases arising under admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as
well as other matters beyond the reach of state and local courts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Moreover, federal courts are more likely to address issues of truly national concern.
State courts did not (and in all probability would not) desegregate public schools, for ex-
ample. Federal courts have the prestige and capacity to do so, and Congress should not
lightly undermine their ability to address important social concerns.
The structure of the federal court system also affects its capacity to absorb an ever-
increasing criminal caseload. The federal courts are unitary. The same district courts that
hear cases of national significance also hear cases involving simple possession of a small
quantity of drugs. Since the Speedy Trial Act requires the courts to give the drug posses-
sion case (and all of the other cases on the criminal docket) priority over everything else,
18 U.S.C. § 3161, to inundate federal courts with additional criminal cases is to directly
interfere with their capacity to perform their unique roles. Cf. Tackett, supra note 121
(although civil filings outnumber criminal filings by 4-1 in the district court in Tallahassee,
Florida, more than 80% of the trials it conducted were criminal, and 90% of them were
drug prosecutions).
183. See supra note 182. Congress is heedless of the federal system's limited capacity.
An amendment to the 1994 Crime Bill offered by Senator Alphonse D'Amato, for exam-
ple, would have made almost every state crime committed with a gun a federal offense.
The amendment would have made touching a firearm at the scene of a crime of violence at
any time during the commission of the crime, or having a firearm readily available at the
scene of a drug trafficking crime (including possession), a federal felony if the crime was
already punishable under state law by imprisonment for more than one year. That would
have brought more than 600,000 state crimes a year-enough to overwhelm the courts-
within the ambit of federal jurisdiction. Naftali Bendavid, Reading Crime Bill's Fine Print;
Overlooked Amendments Draw Fire as Unconstitutional Overly Harsh, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1994, at 1.
Although the amendment was ultimately rejected, in 1993 the Senate overwhelmingly
approved a crime bill containing an identical provision. H.R. 3355 as passed by the Senate
(Engrossed Amendments), Nov. 19, 1993, Item 340, § 2405. The bill was approved by a
vote of 95-4. Status report on H.R. 3355 on Nov. 19, 1993, available on Legi-Slate, Inc., an
electronic data base.
184. As, for example, drug defendants arrested on "federal day." See supra notes 138-
139 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 140. Between 1983 and 1989,
New York's federal day initiative resulted in more than 1,200 federal indictments in cases
investigated by local law enforcement authorities. Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the
War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TmsS, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al. Cf. D.D.
Guttenplan & Jennifer Preston, Rudy Giuliani's Roots Show Him as a Man Apart; He's
Banking on Ambition, Drive, to Bring Him Success, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1989, at 6 (report-
ing that head of Federal Defender Office of Legal Aid Society finds federal day initiative,
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fectively by the states is a misallocation of limited resources.185 The
government cannot do everything at once. Nor can it necessarily do it
better than the states. Executive decisions to exercise federal criminal
jurisdiction must be tempered by pragmatism. 186 Notwithstanding the
which nets small-time dealers, a waste of money; federally prosecuting an individual for a
$10 drug sale will not solve the problem).
185. The draft report of the Judicial Conference's Committee on Long Range Planning
encourages cooperation between the judicial and executive branches in devising standards
on which the Justice Department can rely in promulgating of prosecutorial guidelines. The
recommendation specifically disapproves of relying on potentially more severe sentences
and greater prison capacity as grounds for invoking federal rather than state criminal juris-
diction, absent other special circumstances. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 179, at 23.
186. In March 1988, for example, the National Drug Policy Board adopted a zero toler-
ance drug policy. The zero tolerance initiative targets everyone who enters or leaves the
country while possessing illicit drugs. See "Zero Tolerance" Drug Policy and Confiscation
of Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 10, 11-12, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1988) (state-
ment of William Von Raab, Commissioner, United States Customs Service, and statement
of Admiral Paul A. Yost, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard).
Shortly after the Board adopted this policy, the Justice Department urged federal,
state, and local prosecutors to step up enforcement efforts against drug users who are not
involved in trafficking. Michael Isikoff, "Zero Tolerance" Held in Low Regard, Most Pros-
ecutors Polled Call Reagan Policy Unimportant in Drug War, WASH. POST, July 31, 1988,
§ 1, at A18. Rebuffing the Department, nearly 75% of the top state and local prosecutors
ranked the initiative as either not very important or totally unimportant as a law enforce-
ment strategy. Id.
As implemented by the Justice Department, the zero tolerance policy has two major
repercussions. First, offenders who have a measurable quantity of drugs, regardless of
whether the amount is small or whether the drugs are possessed for personal use, will be
charged criminally and subject to a mandatory minimum penalty. See supra notes 104-108.
This brings into the system countless simple possession cases that were formerly handled
by confiscating the drugs and imposing an administrative fine. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE CONGRESS, IMPACT OF DRUG RELATED
CRIMINAL Acrvrr ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 42 (1989) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE REPORT]. More than 20% of federal prisoners are low-level nonviolent drug
offenders serving their first sentence. See supra note 134.
A zero tolerance drug strategy will keep the courts hopelessly mired in a sea of minor
offenses. If Congress and the executive branch insist on transforming federal courts into
police courts that dispense assembly line justice, the system's ability to recruit high caliber
federal judges is bound to be seriously jeopardized. Cf. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1989
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 8-9, reprinted in THE THIRD BRANCH (Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1990 (expressing concern about low morale on the
federal bench that is attributable partly to inadequate resources and partly to "a growing
caseload of criminal, often drug-related, cases"); Tackett, supra note 121 (U.S. District
Judge Lawrence Irving resigned his position out of frustration; "It's become a numbers
game.... You are a robot now on the bench.").
Second, the zero tolerance policy targets asset seizure under forfeiture laws, regardless
of the quantity of drugs or the value of the asset. Michael Goldsmith & Mark J. Linder-
man, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Reform, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1254, 1272. When the government obtains a pretrial restraining order to pre-
serve the defendant's assets for forfeiture, that imposes an additional strain on the federal
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courts' liberal approach to commerce clause jurisdiction, which gives
the government "carte blanche for federal invasion of the traditional
jurisdictional realm of the states,"' 7 federal jurisdiction must be exer-
cised judiciously.18 The federal law enforcement community must re-
sist making preemptive intrusions into state jurisdiction 89 that are
defender system. JuDicIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra, at 42-43. Cf. Caplin & Drysdale
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of pretrial restraint of
assets, even though it interferes with defendant's ability to retain criminal defense
counsel).
The federal defender system is another tale of woe. Roughly 75% of all federal de-
fendants require appointed counsel. JUDiCLA. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra, at 41-42.
Thus, it stands to reason that bringing more criminal defendants into the system will re-
quire more criminal appointments. Cf id. (observing that the number of appointments has
been rising steadily since 1980); Tom Watson, No Dollars for the Defense; Federal Shortfall
Means CJA Bar May Go Unpaid, LEGAL TnaEs, June 8,1992, at 1 ("[T]he caseload is going
up, as is the number of people needing to be defended.") (quoting Chairman of House
Appropriations Subcommittee that oversees the judiciary).
Yet the same Congress that enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (which added more crimes to the books) and that provided budgetary support
for hiring 123 additional Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 436 special FBI agents, and 311 special
DEA agents, SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29, 36, 39, decreased the federal defender
budget to an amount below the 1994 appropriation. Id. at 101. Enigmatically, the
$27,000,000 reduction in the defenders' budget "reflects downward revisions in the number
of projected representations." Id. at 102.
187. George Danzig Levine, The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code: A Constitu-
tional and Jurisdictional Analysis, 39 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 64 (1972).
188. The draft report of the Judicial Conference's Committee on Long Range Planning
recommends that federal prosecution should be pursued in federal court only when state
prosecution is inappropriate. Specifically, the report identifies five types of offenses that
should be prosecuted in federal court: (1) offenses against the federal government or its
agents, or offenses against interests "unquestionably associated with" the federal govern-
ment; (2) offenses that have significant multistate or international aspects; (3) offenses that
pertain to a sophisticated enterprise and for which federal prosecution would be more
effective, even if the conduct is primarily intrastate; (4) offenses related to serious, high-
level, or widespread public corruption that tends to erode public confidence in the effec-
tiveness of state or local prosecution; and (5) offenses that invoke very sensitive local issues
and engender the perception that a federal prosecution would be more objective. LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 179, at 20-22.
189. Federal prosecution may have a preemptive effect because of state double jeop-
ardy rules. Although the dual sovereignty doctrine permits successive federal and state
prosecutions, Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), many states prohibit state pros-
ecution for conduct that has previously been the subject of a federal prosecution. See, eg.,
ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 656 (West 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-303 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 209 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8 (1992); HAW. REv. STAT. § 701-112 (1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (Burns
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108 (1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 505.050 (Baldwin 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-11 (West 1982); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 111 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294
(Michie 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1982).
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The original role of federal criminal law was auxiliary to that of
the states. Federal law addressed matters of substantial federal con-
cern that were beyond the reach of the states. The evolution of a na-
tional police power paralleled the rise of economic regulation.191
Increased economic regulation inspired a Congress enamored with
commerce-based jurisdiction to add more and more crimes to the
books. Thus, as economic regulation ascended, criminal law flour-
ished as well. But somewhere along the line, federal criminal law lost
its compass. Congress, disregarding the auxiliary nature of federal law
enforcement,192 placed federal criminal law on an evolutionary colli-
sion course with state criminal law. Thus, instead of complementing
state criminal law, federal law began competing with it.19
3
Federal duplication of state criminal law unduly burdens the fed-
eral justice system, which is ill-equipped to supplant local law enforce-
ment. The system is strained to capacity, in large measure because of
the government's war on drugs. Whether the situation will improve or
only worsen in the future depends on whether the legislative and exec-
utive branches develop the courage to heed the lessons of that
experience.
The federal government's assumption of a major responsibility
for maintaining local law and order is not only harmful to the federal
justice system. It is also harmful to the states. When the government
preempts local prosecutions in areas of overlapping jurisdiction, it in-
When the government exercises federal jurisdiction, it preempts states that have dual
sovereignty bars from exercising their own jurisdiction. If the federal interest is insignifi-
cant, federal prosecution is an unwarranted interference with state decision making and
policy formulation. Congress should not seek to regulate the internal affairs of the states
unless the activity implicates a substantial federal interest and requires federal regulation
to effectively address it. Levine, supra note 187, at 66.
190. Levine, supra note 187, at 64.
191. The rise of economic regulation was a function of changes in the nature of com-
merce that linked society in a sense that it had never been linked before.
192. "[T]he principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes" resides with
the states. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
193. Cf. Baker, supra note 20, at 538.
Replete with provisions that duplicate state and local law, the federal criminal code is
in a state of "utter disarray." FRIENDLY, supra note 133, at 58. Although President Lyn-
don Johnson initiated a serious effort to study and recodify the federal criminal code, the
project ultimately failed. See generally Robert Drinan et al., The Federal Criminal Code;
The Houses Are Divided, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 509 (1981).
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terferes with a state's ability to exercise discretion in a way that is
responsive to local concerns. 194 Excessive use of federal jurisdiction
diminishes the prestige of local law enforcement authorities and thus
may interfere with their development of responsibility for and capac-
ity to handle complex matters' 95 or detract from the distinctive role
states play as "laboratories of change."'1 96
However, there are constructive ways that the federal govern-
ment can (and sometimes does) contribute to more effective state law
enforcement-through the development of model state laws, 97 coop-
erative financing of state law enforcement functions, 98 and other sim-
ilar endeavors.' 99 To the extent that this kind of interaction influences
how state and local governments set priorities and policies,200 they oc-
194. Hon. Wade H. McCree, Address, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. H27;270, H-27,272
(1977).
195. Id.
196. Gorelick Address, supra note 170, at 75. See supra notes 143-147 and accompany-
ing text.
197. The 1994 Crime Bill, for example, directs the Attorney General to evaluate state
juvenile handgun laws, to develop model legislation, and to disseminate the study's find-
ings to the states. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2012 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5653 note). Another provision calls for an evaluation of how states protect the confiden-
tiality of communications between victims of sexual assault and their therapists or trained
counselors, and for the development of model legislation to protect those communications
to the maximum extent possible. Id. at 108 Stat. 1921 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13942).
198. In 1978, for example, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
funded a successful program to reduce overcrowding in jails. See Nicholas L. Demos, Are
More Jails the Best Answer?, 22 JuDG"s' J. 12 (1983). See also LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSIST-
ANCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL INSTiTUTE OF JuSTICE, BUREAU OF JusrIcE STATIS-
TICS, PROGRAMS MEETING EFFEcnrvNmss CRIRIA OF SECrIoN 401(A): JuSTICE
SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT ACr 1979 (1980).
Among notable examples in the 1994 Crime Bill is a grant program for states to estab-
lish drug courts that provide intensive supervision as an alternative to incarceration for
first time, nonviolent drug offenders. H.R. 3355 §§ 2201-2209, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994).
See supra note 134. The Local Government Block Grants Act of 1995, H.R. 104-728,
§ 2(a), however, proposes to eliminate the drug court program as a separate entity and to
make establishment of drug courts one of many authorized uses of block grant funds. The
Act passed in the House of Representatives on February 14, 1995 and awaits action by the
Senate as this Article goes to press.
199. See supra note 188.
200. One example from the 1994 Crime Bill is a provision that conditions the availabil-
ity of federal funds for state prison construction on the applicant state's enactment of
"truth in sentencing" laws requiring convicted defendants to serve at least 85% of the
sentence imposed. To be eligible, the state must, in addition, have sentenced a higher
percentage of violent offenders to prison, have increased the average prison term imposed
on violent offenders, and have increased the percentage of sentence that violent offenders
will serve, all since 1993. H.R 3355 §§ 20101-20102, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796,
1814-1817 (1994).
These sentencing strategies can backfire by causing other convicted criminals to be
released early because of prison crowding. See New Sentencing Law Has Unintended Ef-
April 1995]
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cur only with those governments' consent. The use of cooperative
means to achieve a desired end is compatible with established princi-
ples of federalism. Liberal or preemptive exercise of concurrent fed-
eral jurisdiction is not.
The current debate over the appropriate role and scope of federal
criminal law addresses an age-old issue. When Charles Warren spoke
of the "congested condition" of federal court dockets and "the small
prospect of any relief to the heavily burdened Federal Judiciary" if
Congress continues to enact more crimes, it was 1925.201 Henry Hart,
Jr., spoke of the need to reconsider and clarify the bases of federal
jurisdiction at a Harvard Conference on Federalism: "The time has
long been overdue for a full-dress re-examination by Congress of the
uses to which [federal] courts are being put. '202 That was 1954. "It is
now overdue by nearly twenty years more," Henry Friendly observed
in 1973.203
Today, it is overdue by another twenty years more. Unless Con-
gress heeds the warnings of those who speak for the institutions most
profoundly affected by the move to federalize,20 4 the legacy of the fed-
eral justice system (and federalism itself) will remain in jeopardy.
fect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1994, at A16 [hereinafter New Sentencing Law]. The overcrowd-
ing problem is fed, in turn, by defendants' unwillingness to plead guilty to crimes carrying
lengthy mandatory minimums. See Fox Butterfield, California's Courts Clogging Under Its
"Three Strikes" Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at Al. This results in a greater number of
defendants being held in local jails while awaiting trial or a space in a state prison. See
Richard C. Reuben, Get-Tough Stance Draws Fiscal Criticism, ABA J., Jan. 1995, at 16. As
a result of this vicious cycle, early releases from county jails in California were up 122% in
1994. New Sentencing Law, supra.
California's prisons are presently operating at 182% capacity. To maintain status quo
under its new "Three Strikes" law, the state will have to spend $4.5 billion to build 15 new
prisons over the next 5 years. The state built 17 prisons over the last 15 years. Fox Butter-
field, Prison-Building Binge in California Casts Shadow on Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1995, at All.
201. Warren, supra note 16, at 545.
202. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 489, 541 (1954).
203. FRIENDLY, supra note 133, at 4.
204. See supra note 170.
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